CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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BRAZIL, BURMA, ETHIOPIA, INDIA, MEXICO, NIGERIA, SWEDEN AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC.

Joint Memorandum on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Pursuing their efforts of long standing to obtain a cessation of all nuclear weapon tests the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic on 15 September 1965 presented a Joint Memorandum on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

The General Assembly on 7 December 1965 adopted Resolution 2032 (XX) on the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

In this Resolution the General Assembly noted with satisfaction the Joint Memorandum submitted by the eight delegations. It expressed its conviction that agreement in regard to taking this further step towards nuclear disarmament would be facilitated, inter alia, by the important improvement made in detection and identification techniques. In its operative part the Resolution urged that all nuclear weapon tests be suspended. It called upon all countries to respect the spirit and provisions of the treaty on banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. It finally requested the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament to continue with a sense of urgency its work on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and on arrangements to ban effectively all nuclear weapon tests in all environments, taking into account the improved possibilities for international co-operation in the field of seismic detection, and to report to the General Assembly.

The eight delegations are greatly concerned by the fact that all States have not yet adhered to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, that all nuclear weapon tests have not been suspended and that nuclear tests in the atmosphere and underground are continuing. They trust that the Partial Test Ban Treaty will be adhered to and complied with universally. They have been deeply impressed by the dangers of the continued testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere and by the risks inherent in the continued nuclear weapon testing underground, with the resulting development and sophistication

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of nuclear weapons. They view with the greatest apprehension that such a development imparts a renewed impetus to the arms race, bringing about unforseeable consequences in regard to imbalance and mistrust in the relationship between States and causing immense and increasing diversion of human and material resources for purposes of war.

The eight delegations stress their strong opinion that a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests would in itself constitute an effective measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such a treaty, supplementing the prohibitions of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, would make practically impossible for a very long time the development of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear-weapon countries, as well as inhibit the further sophistication of nuclear weapons.

The eight delegations, therefore, view with utmost regret that it has not so far been possible to reach agreement on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which is in the interest of the entire international community.

The eight delegations are conscious of the fact that differences between the nuclear-weapon Powers as to the means of verifying the observance of such a treaty have been an important obstacle to its realization.

For their part, the eight delegations have made sincere efforts, individually offering various ideas and suggestions with a view to facilitating an agreement on the banning of underground tests.

Among these suggestions are

- the idea that underground tests above a certain threshold should be banned by way of a treaty, while, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty, all other underground tests should be suspended,
- the improvement, through international co-operation between national institutions, of the seismic data generally available, so as to create a better scientific basis for the evaluation of seismic events,
- the idea of "verification by challenge", implying a system whereby a party suspected of underground nuclear weapon testing should find it in its interest to provide all available reassuring information, including possibly an invitation for inspection; this system to be related to rules for a possible withdrawal from the treaty if explanations, forthcoming after formal allegations have been made, are not found satisfactory,

- the idea that, in case on-site inspections were agreed upon, a list of impartial inspectors, deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations might constitute a useful instrument,
- the idea that an impartial body of scientists, recruited on a personal basis from neutral countries, should be asked to give their opinion on the general problem of identification of underground tests.

The eight delegations believe that the nuclear-weapon Powers should explore the possibility of adopting these suggestions so that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is concluded early. Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, they reaffirm their strong demand that States responsible for nuclear-weapon tests take immediate steps for their discontinuance.